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Notes and Views

Judicial-Selection Panels: An Exercise in Futility?

By Doris L. Sassower

Hopes were raised recently for improvement in the process of choosing our judges. In early September, readers of the NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL learned that a nine-member impartial panel had been formed by the Committee to Reform Judicial Selection to recommend the eight most qualified candidates for State Supreme Court in Manhattan and the Bronx. From these it was thought that three would emerge as the nominees at th Democratic Judicial Nominating Convention.

In retrospect, disappointment in the ultimate effect of the recommendations of this panel might have been anticipated. A prenomination screening panel under the chairmanship of Judge Bernard Botein was set up in 1968 in connection with the unprecedented number of new judgeships created by the New York State Legislature. Advance assurances were secured from the party leaders that nominations would be limited to those approved by the panel. This was not the case, however. As subsequent events proved, the party leaders failed to honor their bipartisan commitments.

Despite the sour experience of the Botein Committee, we agreed to serve believing that such panels perform a genuine service to the public and the Bar.

The candidates came to us, one by one, each the embodiment of the popular belief that "every lawyer wants to be a judge."

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Meeting almost every night over a fifteen-day period, interviewing several dozen candidates, intensively reviewing and investigating their credentials, the panel faced the difficult decision of choosing among them eight who would carry the banner of "preferred." The Reform Democrats had pledged to endorse from that number those who would fill the three positions. Hours of evaluation, discussion and then, eureka—agreement!

The task done, we went our respective ways, satisfied we had done our conscientious best, gratified that those chosen reflected their own merit, not their party service; their outstanding qualifications, not their "connections."

Minorities Considered

There was some consideration given the idea of judicial representation for our disadvantaged—the blacks, Puerto Ricans and other minorities, as well as for a woefully under-represented majority—women. The panel after all, not unintentionally, reflected these divergent groups. True, too, that the social philosophy of the various applicants who came before us preoccupied us in some measure in our deliberations.

But competence pure and simple, sheer worth undiluted by political involvement remained our unalterable guideposts.

It must be said to their credit (*Continued on page 3, column 5*)

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that the Reform Democrats kept their commitment to the panel to endorse only those candidates the panel approved. As it became clear, no such commitment had been secured from the regulars. It would therefore be less than fair to condemn them for not following a similar course.

Yet, can they not be faulted for not having initiated a panel of their own or joined in the commitment to the one formed under the wing of the Reformers? The commonly understood purpose of such panels being to take the judiciary out of political hands, the inference is that the Regular Democrats had no wish to do so. The fact is that deals for the judicial plums were made before the Democratic Judicial Nominating Convention which only ratified a foregone conclusion among those in the political know, as far as the contested vacancies were concerned.

The numerical division of votes among the delegates to the Democratic Judicial Nominating Convention strictly on intra-party political lines, Regulars v. Reformers, made it obvious that the Reformers' effort to change the course of judicial power politics on the state Supreme Court level was hopeless, at least this time around.

Is there a lesson to be learned from this experience? Does the judicial pre-selection panel offer a viable means of achieving a better judiciary?

Discourage the Hack

On the plus side is the fact that those who came before our panel were almost uniformly of the highest calibre, many of the most brilliant scholars of the profession, our respected judges, our more successful lawyers. If, then, our screening panel did no more than offer recognition and new status to those candidates it recommended, that would be enough to justify it, for, in time, this might lead to their ultimate elevation to the Bench. The inherent virtue of a well-constituted panel is its tendency to discourage the political hack, the mediocrity, or the lawyer whose sole asset is "friends in the right places."

The question is how those genuinely concerned with the improvement of our judicial process can assure the selection of the former over the latter. One might also query whether the device of a screening panel can be made functional. This assumes that one does not wish to do away with party-dominated judicial conventions altogether. There are those who contend that the federal system of appointment is the superior one and produces judges of higher quality.

This is a reasonable expectation where appointments are made by a public official accountable to the people. Yet the appointive hand may also be vulnerable to political pressure and not necessarily point to qualifications alone. Still it is better than a system which pretends that the public elects our judges when, in fact, the choice is preordained so that what we have is appointment by a clique of party leaders not directly responsible to the public.

Certainly, a better judiciary would result from wider use of screening panels and, concomitantly, adoption of their recommendations by those making the appointments.

Vital Factors

The experience of this panel indicates that the workability of a pre-selection panel depends on two basic factors:

(1) The composition of the panel should be as broad-based as possible, including representatives from major county Bar associations as well as community organizations;

(2) Advance public assurance by party leaders (read appointing authorities) that they will choose only from among the panel's recommendations.

In essence, this entails a relinquishment of power by those in power. Some people may feel it is unrealistic to expect this to take place. Perhaps the day when the judiciary is wholly divorced from political influence can be seen only in the eyes of visionaries. But unrelenting public interest and the glare of publicity focused on every judicial vacancy can make that day come sooner.