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February 26, 1997

The Hon. Howard Coble
Chairman
Subcommittee on Court, Intellectual
Property and the Administration of Justice
Committee on the Judiciary
Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Coble:

Reference is made to your February 17, 1997 letter.

Your letter is vague and unclear. Therefore, please clarify the following:

1. Are you responding to my February 10, 1997 letter addressed to Rep. Carlos J. Moorehead, requesting the status of my January 16, 1996 complaint (In Re Shahsultan Jaffer (No. 95-8709) filed with the Subcommittee on Court, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice?
2. If so, are you contending that the Subcommittee will not undertake any investigation, unless "an impeachment resolution has been introduced and referred to the Committee, or that a formal complaint has been brought by a Member"?
3. If so, are you also contending that the evidence attached to the complaint affirmatively showing that Judge Ruth Badger Ginsburg and Clerk William K. Suter do not dispute that they conspired against rights of Jaffer (18 USC § 241), under color of law (18 USC 242), and defrauded United States (18 USC § 371), is of no consequence to the Committee?

FIRST, while no formal complaint mechanism or procedure exists under a statute, the Clause 1(d) Rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives for the 104th Congress expressly vests not only jurisdiction in the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, but, also: "legislative and oversight responsibility for **** (2) Article III Federal courts (including the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the Judicial Conference of the United States, and the Federal Judicial Center); Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil and Appellate Procedure, judicial ethics; and (3) the U.S. Attorneys within the United States Department of Justice."

"The existence of the jurisdiction creates an implication of duty to exercise it." Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 US 377, 356-357, 73 L Ed 747 (1929).

SECOND, while Justice Ginsburg and Clerk Suter have affirmative duty to uphold and protect the Constitution of the United States, in Jaffer's case they refused to faithfully and impartially discharge and perform all the duties incumbent upon them by law. By so doing, they acted in a dereliction of the oath of their office. Impeachment Clauses render all civil officers and judges removable¹ for "Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."

Each unjustified discrimination against a citizen of the United States is a constitutional wrong to that citizen. A conspiracy against rights of a citizen, under color of law, at the Supreme Court level is not only a national scandal, but, also, unjustifiable infringements of universally enjoyed civil rights and liberties.

THIRD, the Committee, after having been apprised of criminal activities at the Supreme Court's level, must undertake a major investigation, as a matter of law. Even the president's pardon power does not extend to impeachment.²

"Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the fact." See 18 USC § 3.

The Supreme Court of the United States is the one federal court that the Constitution explicitly mandates, and its core responsibilities--assuring the states' compliance with the federal law and checking the exercise of powers of the elected federal branches--require the utmost steadfastness and institutional self-confidence.

Furthermore, self-regulation of the legal profession imposes an absolute duty on their members to initiate investigation when they know that an attorney or a judge has committed a crime.

May I please have the courtesy of your immediate response?

Very truly yours,

Shahsultan Jaffer

¹ U.S. Const. Art. II, § 4.

² See U.S. Const. Art. II, § 2, cl. 1.