

The Criminal Activities of
Chief U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge
JON O. NEWMAN et al.
and
THE NEW YORK TIMES.

Part I
DEFRAUDING THE NY STATE AND FEDERAL PURSES

Immediately following the "guilty" verdict in the criminal proceedings against Chief[1] U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals Judge MARTIN T. MANTON for the Second Circuit, the NEW YORK TIMES, in its editorial ("Justice For Sale"), stated (June 5, 1939):

"[F]or some time [Chief Judge Manton's] decisions and acts have placed him under the cloud of suspicion".

The NY Times never explained, as far as this writer is aware, its failure to investigate Manton's suspect "decisions and acts", some of which clearly surfaced seven (7) years earlier in the Manhattan Railway Company [Interborough Rapid Transit] receivership proceedings, which was extensively covered and published by the NY Times.

Nevertheless, then and now, where the judiciary is involved, there appears to be a NY Times policy of avoiding knowledge, with its concomitant responsibilities, by the simple expedient of closing its journalistic eyes, covering it's ears, and holding it's breath.

NAILING ONE, OF MANY, JELLYFISH TO THE WALL

1. All of the activities of Chief U.S. Circuit Court Judge JON O. NEWMAN and those of his co-conspirators involving and/or revolving around the larceny of all the judicial trust assets of PUCCINI CLOTHES, LTD., which left nothing for its nationwide legitimate creditors, are congruent with the "bribe" payments of more than \$3,500,000 by CITIBANK, N.A.

Of the numerous Citibank/Puccini transactions neither Judge Newman, nor anyone else, can relate a single significance instance where his actions or that of his co-conspirators did not comport themselves favorably with the desires of the Citibank/Puccini criminal racketeers -- not one!

2. Some of the activities of Judge Newman and those of his co-conspirators are explicable only by the Citibank bribe payments.

1 At the time the "Chief" Circuit Court Judge was known as the "Senior" Judge.

A substantial portion of the Citibank booty is the property of the United States, however when motions are made to disgorge Citibank of any part of such booty in favor of the United States, it never has been granted, nor has Judge Newman or his co-conspirators ever been able to articulate any justification for their perfidious conduct.

For example, a court order provided that fine monies were payable "to the federal court", which Citibank thereafter diverted to its own coffers, and the federal court/government, like the Puccini creditors, received nothing.

Obviously, the judicial financial records, as transmitted to Congress, which exclusively controls the federal purse, had to be "cooked" in order to conceal the fact that federal assets had been diverted to Citibank's coffers.

At no time or place has Judge Newman, Citibank, or anyone else denied such diversion of monies to the Citibank coffers took place, or the federal entitlement to such monies.

However when motions are made to disgorge Citibank of such booty in favor of the federal court/government, it has never been granted, nor has anyone been able to articulate any justification for such treacherous behavior.

THE TOOLS OF CORRUPT JURISTS.

Rogue judges, such as Chief Judge Newman, "cook" decisions and documentation, in a manner not essentially different than embezzlers who "cook" financial books and records, in order to achieve similar criminal objectives.

Anything "cooked", "concocted" and "contrived" in the "legal notice" published in, and never repudiated by, the NY Times, or in any statement or decision of any judge, court, or official, there is no accounting for the Puccini's judicial trust assets.

Without a filed "final accounting" for the Puccini judicial trust, with due process afforded to those having an interest in those assets, there can be no final order or judgment terminating the Puccini proceeding or any valid order discharging the court appointed receiver or his surety.

Any accounting for the Puccini judicial trust, a mandatory requirement in every jurisdiction, state and federal, which must include its assets as of June 4, 1980, the day it was involuntarily dissolved, and the disposition of those assets, will reveal that these trust assets were made the subject of massive larceny engineered by Citibank, most of which was employed to "bribe" and "corrupt".

Even a superficial investigation will reveal that where the corporation has substantial assets and the power of

judicial appointment exists, all judicial trusts resulting from the involuntary dissolution of corporations in the concurrent judicial bailiwicks of Presiding Justice FRANCIS T. MURPHY of the Appellate Division, First Department (Manhattan & The Bronx) and [former] U.S. District Court Judge CHARLES L. BRIEANT of the Southern District of New York, for the past twenty (20) years have been made the subject of larceny and unlawful plundering, and usually the creditors receive, as in the Puccini matter, nothing!

RELEVANT BACKGROUND - SUMMARIZED

In Part II ("The Turkey Shoot"), whose intended distribution date is January 30, 1997, a fully documented, particularized presentation will be made of "Citibank's estate chasing racket" and the "Murphy-Brieant receivership racket", which is here only summarized in order to make more comprehensible the frauds being perpetrated upon the state and federal governments by members of the judiciary.

1a. In 1989-1990, the NY Times was given, in hand, the hard documentary evidence confirming the fact that all of Puccini's judicial trust assets had been made the subject of larceny engineered by Citibank and its "estate chasing" attorneys which left nothing for its nationwide creditors, and some of the related criminal activities, which the NY Times independently verified and found to be correct in every respect.

The Citibank engineered larceny and bribery began immediately after Puccini, a solvent corporation, was involuntarily dissolved, and at a point in time when \$4,168,225.04 was illegally debited to Puccini's checking account, CHARLES ZANGARA, a Citibank Vice-President, submitted to the Court a perjurious affidavit, which vehemently denied any dissipation of Puccini's judicial trust assets had taken place.

LEE FELTMAN, Esq., Puccini's court-appointed receiver, who had possession of the Puccini books and records knew the Zangara and the other simultaneously submitted affidavits by Citibank's "estate chasing" attorneys were perjurious, and that if the Court believed such affidavits, which it did, a judgment would be entered in favor of Citibank against HYMAN RAFFE, in the approximate sum of \$500,000, and in turn Raffe would obtain a judgment against Puccini for the same amount.

Feltman concealed the perjurious nature of the affidavits of Citibank and its "estate chasing" attorneys, and consequently judgment was entered against Puccini, his trust, for almost \$500,000.

For forty-one (41) months following Puccini's involuntary dissolution, the Citibank conspirators inundated the court with perjurious affidavits and false statements vehemently denying that any of Puccini's assets had been dissipated.

When Citibank and its "estate chasing" attorneys were about to make a bribe payment to Feltman from Puccini's assets of approximately \$150,000, as the agreed quid pro quo for concealing its engineered larceny, and for not making any attempt at recovery on behalf of his judicial trust, the initial hard-evidence of the Puccini larceny surfaced, and in the several months that followed, reached avalanche proportions.

Responding to such disclosures, Citibank and Feltman solicited the assistance of their cadre of corrupt judges and officials, state and federal, who in exchange for bribes, given and/or promised, performed their fiendish tasks.

To compensate and reimburse Feltman for the additional expenses incurred in corrupting judges and officials, the bribe monies promised to him was increased from approximately \$150,000 to approximately \$800,000.

Thereafter the booty was again increased by an additional "more than \$2,500,000", which included the monies payable "to the federal court" which was diverted to Citibank's coffers.

In short, by 1990, the NY Times actually knew, and had copies of the "hard evidence", that the Citibank "booty" was more than \$3,500,000, most of which was disbursed in order to bribe and corrupt, and the NY Times knew the identities of some of the corrupt jurists involved in this criminal racketeering adventure, such as Presiding Justice Murphy and Chief Judge Brieant.

c. Years earlier, the NY Times knew that a twice published "legal notice" was a fraud and a sham, intended to deceive, but did nothing to expose or correct such fraudulent publication.

In every jurisdiction, state and federal, a court-appointed receiver, an arm of the court, must account for his stewardship, which obligation cannot be excused, waived or enjoined, since the public is entitled to know whether its jurists and/or their appointees are "crooks".

In New York, a court-appointed receiver must file an accounting "at least once a year" (22 NYCRR §202.52), and after the expiration of eighteen (18) months, the NY State Attorney General, the statutory fiduciary for all involuntarily dissolved corporations must, as a mandatory "duty", move to compel the court-appointed receiver to account, distribute, and terminate the receivership (NY Bus. Corp. Law §1216[a]).

These non-discretionary mandates notwithstanding, in the more than sixteen (16) years, and more than two hundred (200) months, that have elapsed since Puccini was involuntarily dissolved, not a single accounting has been filed, and not a single application has been made by the successive NY States

Attorney Generals, to compel the filing of an accounting and distribution -- not one!

There is no possible way that a Puccini accounting can be rendered without further disclosing the state and federal judicial involvement in the larceny of its assets, and providing restitution to the victims.

DENNIS C. VACCO, the NY State Attorney General, and his predecessors in office, have refused to exercise any of their fiduciary obligations, even those of a mandatory nature, such as compelling the filing of an accounting, because they know an accounting would reveal that Citibank and a number of high-echelon judges and officials, state and federal, including Chief Judge Newman, are involved in the Puccini criminal racketeering adventure.

For the same unlawful reason, Chief Judge JUDITH S. KAYE, Chairperson of the Administrative Board of the NY State Courts, and her predecessor in office, have refused to exercise their administrative responsibilities in the Puccini matter, which includes compelling an accounting and Judiciary Law §35a statements to be filed.

d. The NY State Attorney General was made the statutory fiduciary for all involuntarily dissolved corporations, as a result of the practices during the reign of WILLIAM MARCY "Boss" TWEED, the Grand Sachem of Tammany Hall.

In the Diary of George T. Strong, an attorney, the following entry is found under the date of December 18, 1869[2].

"... The stink of our state judiciary is growing too strongly ammoniac and hippuric for endurance. ... Some changes is certainly needed most urgently. ... No banker or merchant is sure that some person, calling himself a 'receiver', appointed ex parte as the first step in some frivolous suit he never heard of, may not march into his counting room at any moment, demand possession of all his assets and the ruinous suspension of his whole business and when the order for a receiver is vacated a week afterwards, claim \$100,000 or so as 'an allowance' for his services, by virtue of another order, to be enforced by attachment."

The thereafter impeached NY Supreme Court Justice GEORGE BARNARD appointed WILLIAM M. TWEED, JR., the son of "Boss" Tweed, as the receiver for CREDIT MOBILIER, one of the great scandals in American history, causing giant UNION PACIFIC to

2. As reprinted in "Bribes", John T. Noonan, Jr., Publisher MacMillan Publishing Company, p. 514-515.

petition Congress to have its headquarters moved from New York to Boston, as one of its chief officials, Oliver Ames, wrote[3]:

"When we can get our books away from New York and cleared out of that sink of corruption, we shall feel safe and not until then."

The remedial statutes, enacted after the incarceration and death of "Boss" Tweed, as amended, gave the NY State Attorney General extensive discretionary powers (NY Bus. Corp. Law §1214[a]), and some mandatory duties (e.g., NY Bus. Corp. Law §1216[a]), and there was enacted a statutory, non-waivable, schedule of maximum fees that could be awarded to the court-appointed receiver (NY Bus. Corp. Law §1217), which in the Puccini matter, according to Feltman himself, was \$7,667.27[4].

Murphy, whose only qualification for judicial office was that he was the son of FRANK MURPHY, a Bronx political boss recognized, when he became Presiding Justice about twenty (20) years ago, that in order to restore the status quo ante of the Boss Tweed era, he had to corrupt the NY State Attorney General so that the Attorney General would never exercise his fiduciary obligations, even those of a mandatory nature, unless he, Murphy, consented.

Indeed, at Murphy's request, the NY State Attorney General would actively aid and abet the larceny and plundering of judicial trusts in which he was the statutory fiduciary, which is the ultimate legal abomination.

In short, "Murphy, the Crook" is in bed with the "constable" - the NY State Attorney General, and the creditors of involuntarily dissolved corporations receive only so much as Murphy desires to be distributed which, as in the Puccini matter, is usually nothing.

Murphy, not known for his intellectual or scholarly abilities, obviously did not recognize the impact of *Hans v. Louisiana* (134 U.S. 1 [1890]) on the "Boss" Tweed remedial legislation, which would prove decisive in exposing the corruption of the NY State and federal courts.

Murphy also recognized that full control of the DEPARTMENTAL DISCIPLINARY COMMITTEE was essential to his general scheme of corruption. Consequently, rejecting the findings of an independent body, he dragooned to himself, after more than one hundred years under the control of the ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF

3. "Bribes", *supra*, p. 485.

4 NY Bus. Corp. Law §1217; Matter of Kane, 75 N.Y.2d 511, 516-517, 554 N.Y.S.2d 457, 459, 553 N.E.2d 1005, 1007 [1990]. Even if Feltman's law firm expended any legal effort on Puccini's behalf, and they did not, 22 NYCRR §660.24[f], since repealed, precluded any payment.

THE CITY OF NEW YORK, the operation of that Committee, to himself[5].

Thus, absent a felony conviction which, by statute, mandates disbarment, it is those who resist and expose the operation of rogue jurists and their bagmen/cronies, who are made the subject of disciplinary proceedings and punishment thereunder, not those like the Citibank-attorneys, who bribe and "pay-off" jurists and court-appointed receivers.

DEFRAUDING THE STATE TREASURY

"That a State [or its officers and employees in their official capacities] may not be sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so important a bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of the United States that it has become established by repeated decisions of this court that the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State [or its officers and employees in their official capacity] without consent given; not one brought by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification." [emphasis supplied] (Ex parte State of New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 [1921]).

2a. Every law student is taught that Amendment XI/Hans, is a subject matter[6] infirmity prohibiting a federal court from "entertaining", "maintaining" and/or "hearing" any money damage action, brought by any person, which is defended at state cost and expense.

6 "Jurisdiction of the subject matter. Power of a particular court to hear the type of case that is then before it. Term refers to jurisdiction of court over class of cases to which particular case belongs, jurisdiction over the nature of the cause of action and relief sought, or the amount for which a court of limited jurisdiction is authorized to enter judgment.

A court is without authority to adjudicate a matter over which it has no jurisdiction even though the court possesses jurisdiction over the parties to the litigation ... [and such adjudication] would be void and of no effect because it lacks subject matter jurisdiction." [cited cases omitted] (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Ed.-1990 p. 854).

The few, very rare, exceptions[7] to the Amendment XI/Hans doctrine, where money damage relief is sought, for practical purposes, may be ignored.

If the judge proceeds to make a merit adjudication, although he lacks subject matter jurisdiction, he is acting *coram non judice*[8], and despite the adornment of the black judicial robe, the judge is legally disrobed -- he is, by law, a pretender, usurper, transgressor, and imposter, and any merit dispositions that he might make has no more legal value than had it been rendered by the village shoemaker.

Every Article III federal judge and state attorney general is aware of the statement contained in *Pennhurst State v. Halderman* (465 U.S. 89, 121 [1984]) that:

"[a] federal court must examine each claim in a case to see if the court's jurisdiction over that claim is barred by the Eleventh Amendment[/Hans]" [emphasis supplied]

Every federal judge, in every court, in every case, trial or appellate, initially addresses the question of subject matter jurisdiction, even when the issue is not raised by the parties or their attorneys.

Consequently, anytime, anyone, sees, reads or learns that a federal judge has "entertained", "maintained", and/or "heard" a money damage action brought by any person, where the defense representation is by the state attorney general or at state cost and expense, absent the few very rare exceptions, the conclusion is compelled that: (i) the federal judge is corrupt; (ii) the state attorney general knew before he entered his defense representation that the federal judge was corrupt; (iii) the state judicial clients of the state attorney general also

7 The rare exceptions, not present in any of the situations at bar, are: (i) a clearly stated congressional override; (ii) a clearly stated state constitutional or legislative general waiver of immunity from the exercise of federal judicial power; and (iii) review by the Supreme Court of the United States from a state forum, where there was state representation in the state proceedings.

Even the state attorney general does not have the power or authority to waive the Amendment XI/Hans jurisdictional infirmity, which may be raised for the first time by the state in the Supreme Court of the United States (*Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana*, 323 U.S. 459 [1945]).

8 "*Coram non judice*. In presence of a person not a judge. When a suit is brought and determined in a court which has no jurisdiction in the matter, then it is said to be *coram non judice*, and the judgment is void." (Black's Law Dictionary, *supra*, at 337).

knew the federal judge was corrupt, and (iv) any merit disposition is null and void.

Nevertheless, in every money damage federal Citibank/Puccini, Signorelli/Kelly and Vilella actions, where state judges and officials were defendants, in all of them, without exception, they were defended by the NY State Attorney General, at state cost and expense.

Thus, all dispositions made in such actions are null, void, and of no legal effect, in addition to being a fraud upon the state purse.

b. As part of such unauthorized defense representations, the NY State Attorney General always takes positions contrary to the legitimate interests of the State of New York and Puccini, his statutory fiduciary trust, which is another reason for holding that all dispositions made, state and federal, are null and void.

c. The first hard-copy published federal Puccini decision was *Raffe v. Doe* (619 F. Supp. 891 [SDNY-1985]), issued by U.S. District Court Judge WILLIAM C. CONNER of the Southern District of New York, a proceeding which: (i) lacked subject matter jurisdiction; (ii) lacked personal jurisdiction over this writer; (iii) lacked due process; (iv) was the result of bribery, fraud and corruption; and (v) resulted in the issuance of a transparently invalid injunction, which this writer was not permitted to appeal.

On the face of *Raffe v. Doe* (supra) it reveals that "Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. of N.Y." was representing, at state cost and expense, himself and state judges.

Thus, without more, because of the Amendment XI/Hans jurisdictional prohibition, the compelled conclusion is the decision is null and void, and that Judge Conner is a corrupt federal judge, who NY State Attorney General Abrams knew was corrupt.

d. Obviously, the financial books and records of the NY State Attorney General have been "cooked" in order to conceal the unauthorized and unlawful expenditures by such defense representations.

e. *Raffe v. Doe* (supra) further reveals that where judges and/or their appointees cannot account for their judicial trusts, or have no desire to return their booty when caught, they need only bribe and/or corrupt members of the judiciary, such as NY Supreme Court Justice IRA GAMMERMAN and/or Judge Conner, who will issue for them transparently invalid injunctions barring the aggrieved access to the courts, state and federal, for relief.

A court-appointed receiver must account for his stewardship, and no jurist has the power to enjoin such

obligation, or enjoin restitution to the victims, particularly when it clearly appears that such judicial trust was made the subject of larceny.

Only a bankruptcy proceedings can constitutionally "impair" the rights of a contractually based creditor, and any attempt by rogue jurists such as Gammernan/Conner to achieve that criminal objective violates Article 1 §10[1], Amendment V and XIV of the Constitution of the United States.

f. Since a "final accounting", with due process afforded, was necessary in order to enter a final order or judgment in order to terminate the Puccini proceedings, and discharge the receiver and his surety, the Gammernan/Conner transparently invalid injunctions proved insufficient.

Consequently, there was published in the NY Times a "legal notice" that the court-appointed receiver would present to Referee DONALD DIAMOND his "final accounting" for "approval" and for other relief.

The NY Times also actually knew, long before 1990, that: (i) Referee Diamond, an at-will employee of the court, does not have the legal authority to "approve" any accounting or afford the other relief requested (NY CPLR §4317[b]); (ii) the "final accounting", which was to be "approved" by Referee Diamond was 'phantom' and did not exist; and (iii) that the NY State Attorney General, the statutory fiduciary, had consented to the approval of this 'phantom' accounting by one not having the legal authority to approve, even if the accounting existed, and it did not.

Thus, unless the NY Times published, after it had actual knowledge of the fraudulent nature of such "legal notice", or took some other remedial action, it was arguably violating the federal criminal code (e.g. 18 U.S.C. §§3, 4).

In short, anything contained in the NY Times published "legal notice" or in any judicial decision, expressly or impliedly stating that there exists a Puccini "final account", or a judgment or final order terminating the Puccini proceeding, or discharging the court-appointed receiver or his surety, has been "cooked", "concocted", and "contrived" in order to conceal that all of Puccini's assets were made the subject of larceny, with judicial involvement therein.

DEFRAUDING THE FEDERAL PURSE.

"It is elementary that the United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued ..., and the terms of its consent to be sued in any court define that court's jurisdiction to entertain the suit. A waiver of sovereign immunity cannot be implied but must be

unequivocally expressed. In the absence of clear congressional consent, then, there is no jurisdiction ... in any ... court to entertain suits against the United States." [emphasis supplied] (United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 [1980]).

3a. The statutory language, the uniform practice in the U.S. Attorney's General's Office, and all decisions rendered thereunder⁹ under the FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT ["FTCA"] is crystal clear! --

No federal judge, official, or employee may be defended in a money damage tort action, at federal cost and expense, unless the Attorney General or one of his/her approximately 100 authorized subordinates (28 CFR §15.3) certifies that such judge, official or employee was "acting within the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which the claim arose" (28 U.S.C. §2679[d]).

As Attorney General of the United States JANET RENO, every U.S. attorney and Article III judge knows, no (28 U.S.C. §2679[d]) "scope" certificate, means no federal defense representation, at federal cost and expense.

Once a 28 U.S.C. §2679[d] "scope" certificate is issued the United States is substituted as the defendant for the judge, official and/or employee, and the Attorney General or one of his/her subordinates defends the United States, not the judge, official and/or employee.

Immediately after Janet Reno became Attorney General of the United States, and repeatedly thereafter, she was advised and reminded that frauds were being perpetrated upon the United States by the defense representation, at federal cost and expense, of federal judges and officials who were not 28 U.S.C. §2679[d] "scope" certified.

b. On June 1, 1993, with the media appearance of Judge Newman, as being on the "short list", as a potential nominee for the vacancy on the Supreme Court of the United States, the writer advised President WILLIAM J. CLINTON, mailing copies of his communication to, inter alia, Attorney General Reno, Judge Newman, and the New York Times, and with exacting specificity that Judge Newman was involved in a number of criminal racketeering adventures, including the Puccini racket.

⁹ Kelley v. United States, 568 F.2d 259, 264-265 n. 4 [2nd Cir.-1978] cert. denied 439 U.S. 830 [1978]; Sullivan v. Freeman, 944 F.2d 334, 337 [7th Cir.-1991]; Tassin v. Neneman, 766 F. Supp. 974, 976 [Kan.-1991]; Combs v. U.S., 768 F. Supp. 584, 592 (E.D. Ky 1991); Brennan v. Fatata, 78 Misc.2d 966, 967, 359 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 [1974]; Smith v. Swarthout, 195 Mich. App. 486, 491 NW2d 590 [1992]; Jones v. Littlejohn, Ga.App. , 474 SE2d 714, 715-716 [1996].

Neither Judge Newman, nor anyone else, at any time of place, denied the existence of such criminal rackets, or of Judge Newman's active participation of them.

In all these criminal rackets, Judge Newman and other jurists had dragooned federal defense representation, at federal cost and expense although in none of them had there been any 28 U.S.C. §2679[d] "scope" certification.

Obviously, no authorized official was going to "scope" certify anyone, including Judge Newman, who was involved in the diversion of monies payable "to the federal court" to Citibank's coffers, or similar activities, or the ratification of such activities.

c. Obviously, Attorney General Reno and the involved U.S. attorneys, have been "cooking" their financial books and records, in order to conceal from Congress such unauthorized and unlawful expenditure of federal funds.

4. In such unauthorized representation of federal judges and officials, Attorney General Reno and the various U.S. attorneys have consistently taken positions adverse to the legitimate interests of their client, the United States, in order to accommodate themselves to the desires of the Chief Judge Newman and other rogue members of the federal judiciary.

Thus, even when the exclusive beneficiary is the United States, neither Attorney General Reno, nor her subordinates, support motions to disgorge Citibank of any part of its booty.

5a. Congress has provided that no court has subject matter jurisdiction or the power to "entertain", "maintain" or "hear" any money damage tort action where the defense financial burden is upon the government, unless a "notice of claim" has been previously filed (28 U.S.C. §2675[a]).

No "notice of claim" is required if the action is made against the judge or official in his personal capacity, as were all the Citibank/Puccini, Signorelli/Kelly and Vilella money damage actions, since no attempt was being made to impose liability upon the federal government. Nevertheless, federal jurists have dragooned federal representation in those cases for themselves, at unauthorized federal cost and expense, a subject matter jurisdictional infirmity.

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Part II - "The Turkey Shoot" - To be Distributed Jan. 30, 1997.

Many names and an abundance of decisive documents.

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The public is entitled to know, even when the information is being concealed by the NY Times.

White Plains, New York
January 14, 1997

GEORGE SASSOWER