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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

DORIS L. SASSOWER,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

-against-

GUY MANGANO HON, Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division, Second Dept. of the Supreme Court of the State of New York, THE ASSOCIATED JUSTICES THEREOF, GARY CASELLA and EDWARD SUMBER Chief Counsel and Chairman, respectively, of the Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, DOES 1-20, being present members thereof, MAX GALFUNCT, being a Special Referee and G. OLIVER KOPPELL, Attorney General of the State of New York, all in their official and personal capacities,

Defendants - Appellees,

Federal Court Building 40 Centre Street Room 506 New York, New York

August 29, 1997 10:30 A.M.

ORAL ARGUMENT taken in the above-mentioned caption, held before Joy-Angela Williams, a Notary Public of the State of New York.

PROCEDURAL PROCESS, INC., 928 Broadway New York, New York 10010 (212) 674-1015 SEP.23.1997 4:25PM NO.731 APPEARANCES: DORIS L. SASSOWER, Pro Se JAY T. WEINSTEIN, ESQ., Attorney for all Defendants (212) 416-8573 THE PANEL HON. THOMAS J. MESKILL, C. J., HON. DENNIS JACOBS, C. J., HON. EDWARD R. KORMAN, D. J. EDNY

MRS. SASSOWER: Your Honor, since I am pro se, may I ask permission to have my assistant stand alongside me?

HON. JACOBS: You can pull up a chair.

MRS. SASSOWER: Thank you, Your Honor. If the Court pleases, I am Doris Sassower, the Plaintiff-Appellant, pro se, in this 1983 civil rights action challenging the constitutionality of New York's Attorney Disciplinary Law as written and as applied to This is the case in which not only every New York attorney has an interest but the public as well. The public is directly affected when the State Judiciary, which has exclusive control over all aspects of attorney discipline, uses its disciplinary power for political and ulterior purposes to retaliate against an attorney who has been challenging the politicalization of appointed and elected state court judgeships.

HON, MESKILL: Did you challenge the constitutionality in the state court of these statutes?

MRS. SASSOWER: Yes, I did, Your

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NO.748 P.1/1 1 2 Honor, and since I am limited to five minutes, Your Honor, although I asked for 3 twenty, I would be grateful if I could 5 complete my prepared statement. HON. MESKILL: I would be grateful if 6 7 you answer my question. 8 MRS. SASSOWER: Will it be counted on 9 my time? 10 HON. MESKILL: Yes. You did challenge the constitutionality in the state 11 12 court? MRS. SASSOWER: Yes, Your Honor, I 13 did, and it is stated in the brief, however, 14 15 I never had a full and fair opportunity to 16 litigate that issue, nor was there any right of appeal afforded to me under the law of the 17 18 State of New York. 19 HON. MESKILL: Go ahead. You 20 have answered my question. 21 MRS. SASSOWER: Yes. That alone is an 22 abomination which should not be tolerated be 23

federal court in a democratic society.

JACOBS: Did you appeal the adverse determination in the state court?

1 You have an adverse determination on this 2 Federal Constitutional article. Did you 3 appeal that up to the Supreme Court of the United States? 5 MRS. SASSOWER: Excuse me, Your 6 7 Honor. Is this a hot court? Did you read the briefs? Because if you did, it's all 8 9 there. HON. JACOBS: Mrs. Sassower, this 10 oral argument is our opportunity to ask you 11 12 questions. MRS. SASSOWER: Certainly. 13 HON. JACOBS: And you should be 14 grateful for the opportunity to answer our 15 16 questions. MRS. SASSOWER: Certainly I am. 17 HON. JACOBS: If you don't want to 18 answer my question --19 20 MRS. SASSOWER: No, no. On the 21 contrary, Your Honor, I welcome the 22 opportunity to answer as many questions as 23 Your Honors have. HON. JACOBS: Could you answer mine? 24

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MRS. SASSOWER: Yes, indeed. I

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exhausted every avenue of appeal known to the law of the State of New York, including not only direct appeal, but an Article 78

Proceeding in order to obtain appellate review of the jurisdiction-less, due process-less, suspension order.

HON. JACOBS: Did you go to the supreme court?

SASSOWER: I applied for a Writ of Cert to the Supreme Court of the United States, and, as Your Honor knows, that it is a discretionary remedy. It is not a matter of right, and, as one of about seven thousand applicants for a Writ of Cert, I was not fortunate enough to be within the 75 or so that were chosen. That's precisely why the state law, the Attorney Disciplinary Law of the State of New York, is blatantly unconstitutional, because it denies any right of appeal to an attorney whose law license has been suspended without any written charges, without any hearing, findings, reasons, without any post-suspension hearing. Where the facial order itself does not make

any findings.

HON. KORMAN: You did have with respect to presenting for your suspension case that was served you an order to show cause why you should not be suspended; did you? You have had an opportunity to tell the Court why they should not suspend you; isn't that what due process is?

MRS. SASSOWER: Yes. Unfortunately --

HON. KORMAN: You were served with an order to show cause why you should not be suspended or not?

MRS. SASSOWER: The order to show cause, the suspension, under an unconstitutional court rule, would make no difference. However, the order to show cause did not initiate the proceeding under New York law. An order to show cause is a motion in an action or proceeding. There was no action and there was no proceeding. There was a motion without support of the required petition that started a disability proceeding in May 1990, which was not even served on me, as Section 90 of the Judiciary Law requires,

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explicitly. Whenever an attorney at law is the subject of disciplinary jurisdiction, there must be a copy of charges personally. delivered to the attorney to commence the proceedings. That's Judiciary Law 90, Subdivision 6, that's very clear. Now that didn't happen in my case at all. What happened was that a fraud, an outright fraud was perpetrated by the Court, the Court, the State Court involved and its Grievance Committee Defendants in this action, who are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Appellate Division Second Department, whose Judges I was challenging and exposing as engaging in outright corruption of the judicial nominating process.

Castracan against Colavita and others in 1990 under the State Election Law, as pro bono counsel, challenging what was the corrupt, written deal between the two major parties, Republican and Democratic parties, in the Ninth Judicial District that got together and nailed down every judgeship for the next

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three years starting in 1989 Fall elections. And it wasn't enough that they nailed down every vacancy that was upcoming, they decided to create a few by having an agreement that certain Judges should resign in advance --

HON. JACOBS: Just go to the closing.

MRS. SASSOWER: I haven't even got started. With all due respect to the Panel, I believe this case is too important to fail to ensure the fairness and integrity of the federal appellate process. This oral argument is without prejudice to my objection that this Circuit is disqualified for bias, as particularized by my voluminous April 1, 1997 motion. A Circuit Panel disposed of that motion in a one word decision, "Denied." I respectfully submit that the Panel hearing this --

> JACOBS: Your time is over. HON.

SASSOWER: I am sorry, Your MRS. Honors. I have some very important --

> JACOBS: Your time is over. HON.

SASSOWER: But I was --MRS.

Mr. Weinstein.

2 immunity with respect to the hearing officer, 3 who was the hearing officer at her --JACOBS: Also Oliver Koppell as HON. 5 Attorney General --6 MR. WEINSTEIN: Yes, prosecutorial 7 immunity with respect to him. 8 HON. JACOBS: Special Referee? 9 WEINSTEIN: And the Special MR. 10 Referee was Max Galfunt, and he heard the disciplinary petitions and he enjoys quasi 11 judicial immunity. In addition, with respect 12 to Appellant's allegation that the district 13 court should recuse itself for bias during 14 15 these proceedings, it is simply, factually 16 unsupported in the report. Federal District 17 Courts are courts of original jurisdiction not appellate review, and, as such, they have 18 19 no power to review state courts' 20 pronouncements. Moreover, to the extent that 21 any --22 HON. KORMAN: The state court, in this 23 situation, functions as the court or simply 24 as administrator in the judicial process? 25 WEINSTEIN: The courts, the MR.

judicial courts, they rule. It is a judicial proceeding as opposed to a general rule making proceeding.

HON. KORMAN: This is something that have to be -- invested in the group that the Legislature has created. I am just curious as to what was the court essentially performing, kind of delegating supervisory function over the bar as opposed to necessarily performing a judicial function in resolving cases.

MR. WEINSTEIN: I think it has been established that disciplinary committees, when they hear disciplinary petitions, are performing their judicial function and not, say, an interpretive function or rule making function.

HON. KORMAN: It is a function that the judiciary initiates, prosecutes and resolves.

MR. WEINSTEIN: It is certainly adverse and it certainly has precedence in the state courts for which the Defendants have appellate review.

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MR. WEINSTEIN: Well, this particular

Appellate Division had jurisdiction over Sassower. She was an attorney who was admitted in the Second Department. Under state law the Appellate Division has jurisdiction over disciplinary proceedings for those attorneys who are admitted in their jurisdiction. Her cause for review would be up to the state highest court and then ultimately to the U.S. Supreme Court, which she did, and she raised the same claim, the same issues in her petition to the U.S. Supreme Court that she raises now; not only that, the same transactional event occurred that caused her suspension from the practice of law that she challenges now in Federal District Court and that is where res judicata

Moreover, any challenge that would cast doubt on a state court adjudication that suspended her license to practice law would be inextricably intertwined with the state court adjudication and therefore the Federal District Court would lack judication to make

applies, in addition to --

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